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I. Introduction 
During the 1960's resources for credit activities made up a large 
part of externally funded agricultural programs in Latin America. In 
the nine years 1960 to 1968 the Agency for International Development 
(AID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the World Bank 
~roup (IBRD) provided assistance for agricultural credit worth in excess 
of 727 million dollars in Latin America (Table I). IDB made the largest 
contribution with 348 million dollars, AID was next with 211 million, and 
IBRD followed with 169 million. In the case of AID, over half of the 
total direct assis~ance to agriculture in Latin America has gone into 
credit activities. In addition to this direct assistance, AID has 
helped channel to agricultural credit institutions substantial amounts 
of "counterpart funds" and "local currencies" resulting from Program 
Loans and Public Law 480 sales in several countries.l/ This has been 
especially true in Brazil, where almost 60 million doll3rs worth of 
cruzeiro counterpart funds went into agricultural credit during the 
1964 to 1968 period. 
Most of the assistance to agricultural credit provided by AID and 
IBRD has gone to Latin America. During 1960 to 1968, only ten percent 
of AID's loans and grants for this purpose were made outside this region. 
Likewise, IBRD directed 70 percent of its loans for agricultural credit 
to the same area. 
1960 
.ill.! 1962 
-
AID 23 32 
IBRD c; .., 
IDB 31 44 
TOTALSL!! 5 54 76 
TABLE 1 
AID, IBRD, and IDB Loans and Grants 
For Agricultural Credit in Latin America 
1960-1968/A 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 
32 33 32 33 
19 4 28 49 
73 41 30 so 
124 78 90 132 
1967 1968 
5 19 
61 4 
2L 21 
124 44 
fiA Loans, grants, and technical assistance are classified by year in which agreements were signed. 
/B May not total due to rounding. 
Tota1s/B 
211 
169 
348 
--
727 
Sources: AID, Office of Controller, "Annual Reports on Capital Assistance Projects" (W-253), June 30, 1968, 
and various unpublished Latin American Bureau worksheets. Various annual reports of the Inter-
American Development Bank, World Bank, and IDA. 
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As cnn be noted in Table II, most countries in Latin America h3ve 
received substantial credit assistance. Mexico leads with 112 million 
dollars. Colombia and Brazil closely follow with 97 and 96 million dol-
lars respectively. Several of the smaller countries have ols0 received 
rather large amounts of external as .istnnce: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay. In several cases, emphasis has been placed on 
building viable institutions, almost from scratch, which could handle 
large amounts of agricultural credit. 
Informally, AID, IDB, and IBRD have tended to focus their assist-
ance to agricultur~l credit on somewhat different activities in Latin 
America. IBRD, for example has stressed livestock loons. AID has 
emphasized technical assistance to credit institutions, supervised 
credit to family-sized farms, and general portfolio expansion of loans 
to agriculture. IDB, on the other hand, hns supported colonization and 
farm settlement, and credit for specific agricultural inputs. Most AID 
loons and some IDB loans for agricultural credit include concessional 
arrangements for the borrowing country: low interest rates, grnce 
periods, and long intervals for repayment. 
Despite the stress which has been placed on external funding of 
credit programs in Latin America, little analysis has focused on the 
theoretical bases of these activities. The main objective of the fol-
lowing~ therefore, is to evaluate several of the major assumptions which 
underlie current policy. For discussion purposes, several changes 
are suggested which might improve the results from externally funded 
credit programs. 
Country 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
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TABLE II 
External Funding of Agricultural Credit Programs 
in Eighteen Latin American Countries 
by AID, IBRD, IDB, 
AID 
10,000 
8,666,000 
15,910,000 
3, 724,000 
38,500,000 
15,155,000 
1960 to 196.'3 
IBRD ( u. s. 
15,300,000 
2,000,000 
40,000,000 
19,000,000 
16,700,000 
3,000,000 
IDB Total 
D 0 L L A R S ) 
57,136,202 72,L..l•.6,2C2 
12,200,000 22,866,000 
40,292,000 96,202,000 
25,265,503 47,989,503 
41,930,000 97,130,0(':' 
10,498,958 28,653,958 
Doninican Republic 2,659,500 9,355,000 12, ov:~, .:oo 
Ecu11dor 3,294,000 4,000,000 12,713,222 20,007,2'::.2 
El Salvador 4,470,000 12,920,0CO 
Guatemala 867,000 8,900,000 9,767,00) 
Honduras 7,988,000 7,000,000 14,988,00') 
Mexico 41,500' 000 25,000,000 45,500,000 112,000,000 
Nicaragua 10,400,000 25,030,000 35,430,000 
Pa::1.ama 1,240,000 8,900,000 10,140,000 
Paraguay 6,148,000 11,100,000 10,910,000 28,158,GD0 
Peru 27,424,000 20,000,000 16,000,000 63,42-4,QOO 
Uruguay 7,857,000 12,700,000 3,600,000 24,157,000 
Venezuela 10,734,000 8,140,000 18,87t~,QQ.Q 
TOTALS 210,526,500 168,800,000 347,840,885 727' 167' 38_) 
Sources: AID, Office of Controller, "Annual Report on Capital Assistance Pro~ect:s 
and Technical Assistance Projects" 0N-253), June 30, 1968, and variouc. 
unpublished Latin American Bureau Worksheets. Various annual reports of 
the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank and IDA. 
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II. Economic Rationale of Agricultural Credit Policy in Latin AmericA 
Although generalization is somewhat difficult, several common 
assumptions can be noted in the agricultural credit programs in L3tin 
America, Commitments for this purpose have been closely tied to the 
following beliefs: 
1. Credit shortage is one of the major bottlenecks causing low 
land and labor productivity in trad{tional agriculture. Not only does 
a current shortage of production credit exist, but the future transfor-
mation of less developed agriculture will also require m3jor credit 
infusions to fuel technological ch3nge and the on-farm-capital-formation 
process. 
2. Concessional lending arrangements on farm credit are necessary 
and justified because of the following: a) Farmers have been exploited 
by lenders who charge exorbitantly high rates of interesto b) Most 
traditional farmers need special inducement to use credit and highly 
productive inputs. c) Low interest rates are further justified as an 
income transfer mechanism to improve farrJers' incomes, and/or to offset 
fiscal or pricing policy which adversely ~£feet agriculturalists. d) 
Since intermediate credit institutions in agriculture often receive 
funds from external agencies under concessione! arrangements, these insti-
tutions ore not justified in charging rates which are substantially 
higher. 
3. Little savings capacity exists in rural areas, and marginal 
propensities to save are low. Almost all funds for credit, therefore, 
must come from outside the agricultural sector. 
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Given the emphasis placed on agricultural credit programs, it is 
disturbing to find that very little empirical evidence bas been osseo-
bled to confirm these vital policy assumptions. Several of these 
assumptions ore questionable and alternative suppositions should be 
seriously explored. With the existing lack of economic research on 
credit in Latin America, a discussion of this subject must be largely 
based on all too little hard evidence. The following discussion of 
these assumptions, therefore, is by necessity more suggestive than 
conclusive. 
III. Agricultural Credit Shortage? 
Several different types of information hove been used to suggest 
that a serious shortage of agricultural credit exists in Latin America. 
The most prominent of these have been: 1) the fact that large amounts 
of external funds have recently been absorbed by the agricultural 
credit systems in Latin America, 2) comparative data showing that 
countries in Latin America hove substantially less agricultural credit 
than developed countries and dote showing that the amount of agricul-
tural credit available in certain Latin American countries is less than 
in others, 3) the impression that high interest rates in the informal 
credit market indicates a shortage of credit, 4) the apparent insatiable 
demand for agricultural credit in most Latin American countries, and 
5) the knowledge that technological change in agriculture,which is 
occurring in parts of Latin America, bas a high credit propensity. 
A. Comparative data 
Comparative information suggests that institutional agricultural 
credit is not very scarce in Latin America. In the United States, for 
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exanple, total credit for agriculture amounted to over 53 billion dol-
lars at the beginning of 1969.~/ A little less th~n half of this was 
for production and/or consumption loans ($25.3 billion). Comparing this 
with the total gross value of agricultural output in the U. S. in 1968 
($47.6 billion)d/ results in a ratio of .53. In Taiwan, institutional 
agricultural credit 3mounted to 8.9 billion new Taiwanese dollars (NT$) 
in 1965.~/ Since this was 65 percent of all agricultural loons, total 
agricultural credit amounted to about 13.6 billion NT$. The gross value 
of agricultural production in the some year, on the other bond, amounted 
to 37.5 billion NT$. The ratio of total credit to product was, there-
fore, • 37. 
Table III includes similar data on value of agricultural output and 
institutional agricultural credit for 18 Latin American countries. 
Because of definitional problems regarding agricultural credit in some 
countries and the usual difficulties associated with deflating currencies 
and conversion to dollar values, absolute values in this table should 
be interpreted with some caution. 
As con be noted in the first port of Table III, institutional agri-
cultural credit in the 18 countries analyzed expanded in real terms 
rather rapidly from 1960 to 1967-1968, averaging on increase of 12 per-
cent per year. (It will be argued later that non-institutional agricul-
tural credit in Latin America is insignificant). In 1967-1968, about 
4.7 billion dollars worth of agricultural credit was in force in these 
countries. Parenthetically, this was approximately the amount of farm 
credit in force in the u. s. J,ske StatPs of Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota in 1967.i/ 
TABLE III 
Domestic Credit Claims on Private Sector, 
Agricultural Credit, Gross Domestic-Product from Agriculture, 
with Indexes, Rates of Change, and Ratios 
for Eighteen Latin American Countries 
1960 and 1968 
Domestic Credit Claims A~ricu1tural Credi~ Gross Domestic Product 
on Private SectorTl Year-end Balances/3 from Agriculture/4 
Country 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
Rnte of Millions of Index Millions of Index Q Millions of Index c 
Change Dollarsil. 1960=100 Dollars 11:. 1960=100 A Dollarsfl. 1960=100 :F 
18 Country Totals 
1960 10,931 100 2,439 100 I .22 10' 717 100 .23 00 1967 or 1968 15,106 I 138 4,737 194 .31 13,130 (65-67) 123 • 36 Average Annual 
Rate of Change 5% 12% 3% 
Argentina 
1960 2,380 100 393 100 .17 2,072 100 • 19 1968 2,833 112 555 114 ,20 1,995 ('67) 96 • 28 Average Annual 
Rate of Change 1% 2% 0% 
Bolivia 
1960 8 100 2 100 . 25 123 100 .02 1968 32 400 15 750 .47 120 ( '66) 98 .13 Average Annual 
Rate of Change 50% 81% 0% 
Brazil 
1960 3,557 100 606 100 .17 2,fJ87* 100 .20 
1968 4,311 121 1,417 234 ,33 3,845* ( 1G5) 129 .37 Average Annual 
Rate of Chac.ge 3% 17% 6% 
Domestic Credjt Claims Agricultural Credjt Gross Domestic Product 
on Private Sector71 Year-end Balances73 from Agric,Ilture/4 
Country 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
Rate of Millions of Index Millions of Index c Millions of Index c 
Dollarsfl.. 1960=100 Do lla rail. - Dollars/2 Change 1960=100 A 1960=100 F 
-
Chilef1 100 .31 
-mo 415 100 127 221~ 100 .57 
1968 611 147 213 167 .35 276* ( '67) 125 .77 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 6% 7% 4% 
I 
\.0 
Colombia I 
1960 646 100 231 luO • 36 1,22 7 100 .19 
1968 1,101 170 386** 167 .35 1,499 ( 1 67) 122 .26 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 9% 8% 3% 
Costa Rica 
1960 114 100 68 100 .60 110 100 .62 
1968 143 125 104 153 .73 156 ( 167) 142 .67 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 3% 7% 6% 
Dominican ReEub1ic 
1960 103 100 21 100 .20 221 100 .10 
1968 174 169 57 271 .33 244 ( 1 67) 110 .23 
Average Annual 2% Rate of Change 9% 21% 
Ecuador 
1960 158 100 20*** 100 .13 287 100 .07 
1968 224 142 48*** 240 ,21 356 ( '6 7) 124 .13 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 5% 18% 3/o 
Domestic Credit Claims Agricultural Credit Gross Domestic Product 
oo Private Sector1I Year-end Balances73 from Agriculture/4-
Country 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) '(G) (H) 
Rate of Millions of Index Millions of Index c Millions of Index Q 
Change Dollars/2 1960-100 Dollars/2 1960=100 A Dollarsfl. 1960=100 F 
-
El Salvador 
1960 140 100 40 100 .29 178 100 .22 
1967 - t91 136 51 128 .27 231 130 .22 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 5% 4% 4% 
Guatemala 
1960 94 100 39** 100 .41 325** 100 .12 I 
1968 220 234 52 133 .24 404 ( 167) 124 .13 ~ 0 
Average Annual I 
Rate of Change 17% 4% 3% 
Honduras 
1960 35 100 7 100 .20 163 100 .04 
1968 75 214 31 449 .41 193 ( 167) 118 .16 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 14% 44% 2% 
Mexico 
1960 1,145 100 472 100 .41 1,210***~'( 100 .39 
1968 1,865 163 1,065 226 • 57 1 ' 56 4**** ( I 6 7) 129 .68 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 9% 16% 4% 
Nicara&ua 
52 32 100 .62 115** 100 .28 1960 100 
1968 142 273 ns 267 ,60 159 ( 167) 138 . 53 
Average Annual 
5% Rate of Ch-ange 22% 21% 
Domestic Credit Claims Agricultural Credit Gross Domestic Prod~c! 
on Private Sector1t Year-end Bala~ces73 from Agriculture~ 
Country 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
Rate of Millions of Index Millions of Index c Millions of Index c 
Change Dollar£ 1960=100 Dollars/2 1960=100 A Dollars/2 1960=100 F 
Panama 
1960 99 100 6** 100 .06 98 100 .06 
1967 226 228 23 383 .10 156 159 .15 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 18% 40% 8% 
Paraguay 
1960 28 100 10 100 • 36 123 100 .08 I 
1968 83 296 33 330 .40 148 ( 167) 120 .22 ...... ...... 
Average Annual I 
Rate of Change 25% 29% 3% 
~ 
1960 343 100 116 100 .34 537 100 .22 
1967 444 129 160 138 .36 641 119 .25 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 4% 5% 3% 
Uruguay 
.14 1960 420 100 59 100 222 100 .27 
1967 301 72 18 31 .06 242 109 .07 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change -4% -10% 1% 
fenezuela 
1960 1,197 100 190 100 .16 498 100 .38 
1958 2,172 128 448 236 .21 901 ( 167) 180 .so 
Average Anm:al 
Rate of Cht<nge 10% 17% 1 llo 
*Net domestic product rather than gross domestic product. 
**Includes some data estimated by the author on Colombia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 
***Data is for new loans made during the year, rather than year-end balances. 
****Expressed in 1950 market prices and converted to dollars, using 1950 excha11ge rate of 
11.57 pesos per dollar. 
L! Taken from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
/2 Local currency values in each case, except some data for Mexico (see above) and Chile 
-- (see footnote 4) were adjusted by the yearly consumer prlce index figures with base in 
1963, published by the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
various issues. The 1963 exchange rate of local curr~cy for dollars was then used to 
convert to an "adjusted dollar value." The figures in the table, with the exceptjo11s 
noted, therefore, show the 1963 purchasing power of local credit expressed in dollars. 
Ll Figures on agricultural credit represent institutional lending and were taken mostly 
from annual or monthly reports of each country's central bank. In several cases, annual 
reports of individual banks were used, and in one or two cases, unpublished Agency for 
International Development reports were used. 
/4 United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1968, Vol. I (New York: United 
Nations, 1969) various pages. 
/5 Local currency values in Chile were adjusted by a yearly price index with base in 1965. 
The 1965 exchange rate of escudos was then used to convert each year to an "adjusted 
dollar value". The figures for Chile, ther~fore, show 1965 purchasing power of esc~1dos 
expressed in dollars. 
I 
1-' 
"" ' 
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It is also interesting to note that the tot~l value of agricul-
tural production credit in these 18 countries in 1967-1968 was equal 
to about one-third of the aggregate value of tot~l agricultural produc-
tion, about two-thirds the ratio found in the United States for non-
real est~te credit.i/ But, at the some time, it is more or less equ3l 
to the credit-to-product ratio described for Taiwan. 
A review of the data for each country in T1ble III also shows ~ 
good deal of difference among countries m the ratio of agricultural 
credit to total value of agricultural production. Chile, Costa Rico, 
Mexico, Nicarngun, and Venezuel~ all had agricultur~l credit in 1967-
1968 equal to or greater than half the value of their agricultur~l pro-
duction in 1967-1968. 
It is interesting to note as a side light that external funds for 
credit (Table II) represented a substantial part of the increase in the 
money available for agricultural credit in Latin ~erica over the 1960 
to 1967-1968 period (Table III). For the 18 countries studied, the 
value of institutional agricu1tur~l credit increased from approximately 
2.4 billion dollars worth in 1960 to 4.7 billion in 1967-1968. The 
.7 billion dollars provided by external funds was equivalent to about 
one-third of the increase. As can be noted in comparing data in Tables 
II and III, a major part of the increase in credit in several cases can 
be largely explained by the amount of exte:&:ual £unds brought into the 
country: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. 
Additional information in Table III suggests that there are sub-
stantial differences among countries in Latin ~erica with respect to, 
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not only grmvth in credit funds for agriculture, but nlso chnnges in 
the portions of total institutional credit in the country directed to 
agriculture. Bolivia, Brazil, The Douinican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, 
and Mexico hnve substantially increased the shore of total credit receiv2d 
by agriculture (Column E). Coloobia, El Salvador, Guateualo, Nicaragua, 
and Uruguay, on the other hand, have decreased the shore of credit 
received by agriculture. Several countries have surprisingly high 
ratios of agricultural-credit-to-total-domestic-credit: Costa Rica, 
Mexico, and Nicaragua. Several countries also have rather low ratios: 
Panama and Uruguay. 
The relative ndequncy of the agricultural credit system in some of 
the Latin American countries is also suggested by the data in Column H, 
Table III. As mentioned earlier, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
and Venezuela have recently had high ratios of agricultural credit to 
value of agricultural production. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay 
have had low ratios, however. 
Interestingly, tests of significance on rank-order and product-
moment correlation coefficients relating overage annual rates of growth 
in institutional agricultural credit (in Column D, Table III) and average 
annual rates of grcwth in gross domestic product from agriculture (in 
Column G, Table III) showed no dependency. Similar tests of the same 
coefficients but relating average annual rates of growth in domestic 
credit claims on private sector (in Column B, Table III) and average 
annual rate of growth in agric11l tu1.·ol credi.t (in Column D, Table III) 
suggested a rather close relationship. That is, looking at Latin America 
as a whole, high rates of growth in agricultural credit are not closely 
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associated with rapid growth in agricultural output. This ony, in part, 
be due to time log questions. 
Unfortunately, the data on the flow of external funds to the agri-
cultural credit systems and the comparative inforoation on amounts c£ 
credit in Latin America versus the more developed countries ore net con-
clusive in terms of verifying on agricultural credit short~ge. It might 
be argued that production possibilities are such in Latin America that 
additional credit cannot be efficiently used; that is, ~any farm~rs ore 
operating on low profile production functions. 
B. Characteristics of informal credit markets: 
Several characteristics of the inforoal credit system ore also 
often cited as evidence supporting the claim that agricultural credit 
is in very short supply.l/ On close analysis, however, this evidence 
appears to be rather inconclusive with regard to Latin .~erica. 
A review of studies on infonnal credit systems shows that relatively 
little information is available on Latin 1~erican conditions; most of 
the conventional wisdom on this topic appears to stem from experience 
in other regions of the world, especially Asia.~/ It has been usually 
held, for example, that the informal system (e.g., private individuals, 
money lenders, and merchants) provide a large part of total rural credit 
in less developed areas. In India, for example, studies hove shown 
that less than 20 percent of total rural credit is furnished by the 
formal credit system.~/ In Thailand, only five percent of the agricul-
tural credit was reported coming from institutional leuders.lO/ 
Less comprehensive data on several Latin hmerican countries sug-
gest o much smnller role for informal credit in the total agricultural 
-16-
credit system. In Ecu~dor Stitzlein found only about ten percent of 
the totnl credit used by about 1,000 formers w.::ls supplied by non-
institutional sources.ll/ Some two-thirds of the fnrns in his snmple 
were less than 20 hectares in size. He also found that only nbout hnlf 
of the farmers surveyed used credit. Erven found even less non-institu-
tional credit in southern Brazil. He surveyed 233 commercial crc,p .::lnd 
hay forms and found that only three percent of their total agricultural 
credit came from non-institutional sources.12/ In the so~e general oren 
of Brazil, but araong small form operntors, Rosk and Rno found only one-
third of total form credit anong 200 fonns came from non-institution~] 
sources. 13 / Nisbet's study of informal rural credit in Chile showed that 
non-institutional credit made up only ten percent of total credit among 
the farmers he surveyed. 14/ Tinnermeier also found that nco-institutional 
form credit was not significant among almost 200 farmers in a coloniza-
tion oren of Colombia.11/ Montero, likewise, found non-institutional 
credit to be insignificant for 239 fnrmers he interviewed in n major 
ogriculturnl region of Colombia.l6/ His sample included large as well 
as smoll fnnns. Although non-institutional loans made up about one-
quarter of the number of loons held by these farmers, over a four-year 
period they equalled less than four percent of total funds borrowed. 
Anthropological studies by Nash and Tax of Indian communities in Central 
America showed thnt institutional credit was almost totally lacking, but 
they also found that- o11ly mf>d~st am0nnt.s o{ n<>u-institutionnl credit 
were used.l2/ A study in Costa Rica of 320 farms in 1964-1965 showed 
that only 20 percent of total credit used by these fnrms wns provided 
by the informnl credit system.l8/ 
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If the above cited studies are representative, it suggests that 
the amount of non-institutional credit in rural areas of Latin limericc 
is relatively unimportant. If there is a large segment of econcmicnlly 
justified demand for agricultural credit, the non-institutional mcney 
markets have not exploited the opportunity. (Does the lack of n sizeable 
info~al credit system indicate a deficiency in effective demand?) 
High interest rates in the informal credit market also have often 
been cited as indicating credit shortage. That is to soy, demand 
pressures for credit ore large. These pressures in turn face a small 
pool of loanable funds embodied in a highly inelastic supply schedule. 
It is, therefore, concluded that competition for these funds bas driven 
interest rates up and resulted in monopoly profits for owners of loanable 
funds.li/ 
Again, a review of various studies which have treated the interest 
rates charged in the informal credit markets in rural Latin America 
strongly suggest that interest rates are weak indicators of production 
credit shortage. Several aspects of this need to be considered: First, 
it may be that the importance of extremely high rates of interest in the 
informal credit markets in Latin America has been greatly overstated. 
Nesbit showed in Chile, for example, that a majority of the loans mode 
within the informal credit system which he studied were lent at zero or 
negative real rates of interest.~/ Stitzlein showed in his Ecuadorian 
study that an average annual nominal rate of interest of less than 20 
percent was changed on non-institutional lonns among the farmers he 
studied.21/ Over 40 percent of the nN1-iustit:ntioua1 lN!nS in his study 
carried no interest cha-rgP.g/ It may well be that the prevalence of 
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high interest rates in the inforMal credit m~rket, at least in Lnt~n 
!~ericn, hns been grossly overstated. 
Another aspect of this questivn is thnt relatively high r~tes lf 
interest ~ay be justified on loans 1n the informal credit market. Tha 
bulk of these loons nre small, short term, unsecured, snd nostly for con-
sumption. Lenders 1 administrative costs ore, therefore, high. Similar 
type loans in developed countries also corry relatively high rates cf 
interest. Moreover, high interest rates may be justified because of the 
high opportunity cost of capitol 1n developing countries, 1enders 1 risks, 
cmd the high rates of inflation which ore common in a number cf Latin 
American countries (Table IV)23/ 
In conclusion, on analysis of the informal credit markets in Latin 
America does not present firm proof that o significant shortage of 
production credit exists in the rural areas. It may well be that these 
informal credit markets are not large because of the lock of demand for 
their services. It is also apparent that the high-interest-rote-problem 
has been oversold, and that current interest rates charged in this 
market may be rather modest considering the nature of the services 
rendered. It may well be that a good bit of the current non-institutional 
credit is supplying a market which is largely unrelated to the market 
for productive agricultural inputs. Thus, marginal costs for credit in 
this morket may be of little or no value in determining the marginal 
productivity of capitol for p1:odu~t.lve ngricultural inputso 
In conclusion characteristics of the informal credit market in 
' 
Latin America do not provide firm evidence of serious credit shortage 
for productive agricultur:Jl purposes. 
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C. Strong demand for institutioncl credit 
It is rather common throughout L3tin !wericn for agricultural 
credit requests to substantially exceed available funds. From this, 
it has been concluded that a good deal of economically justified leans 
~re not made because of credit shortage. 
It has also beencommon throughout most of Lntin /lmerica~ however, 
tc price institutional agricultural credit at concessional rates of 
interest. In Colombia, for example, most institutional agricultural 
credit is loaned at rates of interest within the range of seven to ten 
percent. Borrowers of capital in the non-agricultural sector, on the 
other hand, pay from 18 to 25 percent for their funds. Hardly a country 
in Latin America does not have similar arrnngements. If the marginal 
opportunity costs o£ capital in the country are in the general range of 
the charges on credit which non-agriculturalists are willing to pay, 
it is not surprising that agricultural credit is so popular. 
A further reason for the strong demand for institutional agricul-
tural credit can be illustrated from data shown in Table IV. During 
the period of 1961-1968, six of the Latin American countries experienced 
average rates of infl~tion in excess of ten percent per year. These 
countries, in turn, extended almost sixty percent of the agricultural 
credit during 1967-1968 in Latin i\merica (Table III). A major portion 
of the institutional agricultural credit in ~rgentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, nnd Urugu3y d~~t.iug th('> 1 Q60 's was lent at real rotes of 
interest which were negative. That is, nominal rates of interest were 
less than monetary depreciation. It is little wonder then that farmers 
are clamoring for negatively priced agricultural credit. Without an 
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Table IV 
Annual Percentage Changes in Consumer Prices Indexes 
in Various Let:i.n Americar> Countries 
' 
1961-1968 
Annual 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Average 
1961-68 
Argentina 19 32 28 18 38 30 26 10 25 
Bolivia 7 3 -1 11 5 11 3 3 5 
Brazil 43 61 81 85 41 46 26 25 51 
Chile 9 27 45 39 26 17 21 28 27 
Colombia 5 5 46 2 15 14 7 6 13 
Costa Rica 0 6 2 2 -1 2 2 3 2 
Dominican Republic -3 10 9 2 -2 0 2 0 2 
Ecuador 3 4 5 3 6 3 6 3 4 
El Salvador -4 2 2 2 0 -2 2 2 1 
Guatemala 3 -1 1 -1 -1 3 -1 4 1 
Honduras 0 5 2 4 4 4 -4 5 3 
Mexico -3 3 0 3 5 4 3 2 2 
Nicaragua -2 0 3 2 4 5 0 n/a 2 
Panama 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 
Paraguay 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 3 1 
Peru 7 5 10 12 16 8 19 10 11 
Uruguay 10 11 44 35 88 50 90 126 57 
Venezuela 1 ··2 1 -2 5 0 -1 0 1 
Source: International Monetary Fundt International Financial Statistics, 
IMF, May, 1969. 
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adjustment to efficiency prices, it is difficult to determine the 
economic effectiveness of the current strong dem3nd fer credit. 
D. On-f~rm capitol formation 3nd new technology requires cred1t 
Again, it has been rather widely held that large doses of credit 
are necessary to facilitate rapid on-farm c~pitnl formation and techno-
logical change in agriculture. This view has been recently ch~llenged 
by some who orgue that development of appropriate new technology must 
precede expansion uf the credit system.24/ While it is apparent that 
technological barriers are important in n number of situati0ns around 
the world, and that high priority should be given tc rese~rch aimed at 
resolving these barriers, it may well be that in other circumstances 
credit can be the leading edge of technological-change policy. Rnsk 
and Roo have pointed out, for example, that agricultural problems tend 
to be very heterogeneous and that uniform policy prescriptions are often 
net appropriate.~/ In a study of farms in southern Brazil they found 
that similar-sized livestock ranches and crop forms had approximately 
the same amount of capitol investment, but that credit use was 20 times 
larger on the crop forms. Their study suggests that among this particular 
group o£ farms, large doses of credit played a leading role in the change 
from livestock to crop f~rming. 
While data is rather inconclusive with regard to widespread agri-
cultural credit shortage in Latin America, the Rask-Rao inform3tion 
suggests that credit bottlene<'ks may bE> oC'cnr:ring where the moderniza-
tion process is most intense. 
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IV. Need fur Concessionol Interest Rates 
n. Implications for f.:lrmers 
As already suggested, there h::1ve been n number of rease:ns used fer 
justifying low rates of interest ur. institutional credit. Fur example, 
the existence of high interest rates f~r infonnal credit is ~ften cited 
as a reason. It was argued earlier that the importance of exploitive 
rates vf interest on informal credit in Latin !II!lerica has been greatly 
overstated. High interest rates in the informal credit market shculd 
be dismissed as a reason for concessional rates in the formal system. 
An additional justificaticn for lew interest rates has been that 
they prcvide the special inducement necessary to convince farmers to 
adopt productive inputs which require credit use. But, do farmers need 
to be bribed to do something which is supposedly profitable? A rather 
large amount of recent research has strongly suggested that farmers 
efficiently allocate the resources at their disposal, including credit.26/ 
The recent rapid adoption of new cereal varieties in Asia also strongly 
suggests that farmers in LDC's will very rapidly adopt new technology 
if it pays.rL/ A low-interest-rate bribe may simply induce farmers to 
make expenditures which would otherwise not be in his economic best 
interests and/or to use credit for non-productive purposes. 
Low interest rates for farmers have also been justified as an in-
come transfer mechanism. That is, farmers are given a break on credit 
because they are poor; or farmers are given concessional interest rates 
to partially offset national pricing or fiscal policy which adversely 
affects farm income. 
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Most of the institutional credit in Latin 1\merica is currently going 
to relatively large landowners who often have other occupations outside 
of farming, and since the income subsidy is tied to credit access, it 
appears that few of the benefits from concessional interest rates are 
filtering down to the rural poor. It is also an unanswered question as 
to how much of this fungible credit is leaking out of the agricultural 
sector through multiple occupational structures. Aside from the politi-
cal and administrative advantages associated with the "invisible income 
transfers" through concessional interest rates, the practice has little 
in its favor. Direct cash payments, development of new technology, 
subsidizing the price of specific inputs, or adjusting pricing or taxing 
policies would seeN to be a more efficient means of easing farm income 
problems. 
b. Implications for credit agencies 
The figures in Table V indicate how rapidly the real value of 
credit funds can be ''washed out" at various negative rates of interest. 
For example, if the rate of inflation in a country is averaging about 
25 percent per year, and farmers are charged a nominal rate of interest 
of ten percent, then a negative real rate of interest of fifteen percent 
per year is implied. As can be seen in Table V, a negative rate of 
interest of fifteen percent would result in the real value of credit 
capital being nwashed out" to half its original value in a little over 
four years. As suggested earlier, the high rates of inflation in Argen-
tina, Bra~il, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay (Table IV) have resulted 
in negative real rates of interest being charged on most institutional 
agricultural credit. In this light, it is rather remarkable that these 
Negative 
Interest(R) 
.01 
.02 
.03 
.04 
.05 
.10 
.15 
.20 
.so 
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Table V 
Number of Years Until Credit Funds Depreciate 
to Half-Value at Various Negative 
Rates of Interest 
Conversion Half-value 
Factor (i) in Years (n) 
.0101 69.0 
.0204 35.0 
.0309 23.0 
.0417 17.0 
.0526 13.0 
.1111 6.6 
.1760 4.3 
.2500 3.1 
1.0000 1.0 
Note: R = Rate of depreciation of real value of credit funds, or the negat:ve 
rate of interest. 
1 i ;: 1 - -:;-::;:-l.-R 
vn- 1 
- U+i)n 
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countries, with the exception of Uruguay, were able to substantially 
increase the real value of their credit portfolios during the 1960's. 
Because of the capital washout, a much larger amount of capital has 
been transferred into agricultural credit systems than is indicated in 
Table III by the difference between dollar value of credit in 1960 and 
dollar value of credit in 1967-1968. 
This capital erosion has several adverse effects on lending agencies. 
It tends to decrease the real value of the loan portfolio, of course, 
but it also forces the agency to look to external assistance for funds 
to increase portfolio real si~e. Under conditions where positive real 
rates of interest are being charged, landing agencies can help build 
their portfolio by generation of some internal profits. Because of low 
interest rate policy throughout most of Latin America, internal profits 
have been negligible. In addition, abstracting from the capital erosion 
problem, interest rates are often too low to pay out-of-pocket expenses. 
This is especially true where intensive supervision is tied to credit 
and overhead costs may run as high as ten to twenty-five percent of the 
loan portfolio per year.2a/ Since overhead costs cannot be covered 
under these conditions, administrators are not "under-the-gun" to run 
a tight ship with regard to other administrative matters. Flabby admini-
stration can result. 
It could also be argued that by holding the interest rates down, 
governments have kept the private banking system and the informal 
credit market from providing substantial amounts of credit to agricul-
ture. Governments, thus, are forced to try to legislate the granting 
of agricultural credit by private banks.~/ 
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In summary, there does not appear to be a strong set of reasons 
for granting concessional rates of interest to agriculture in Latin 
America. 
V. Rural Savings Capacity 
It has been rather widely held that the savings capacity among 
rural people is very low. It has also been assumed that these rural 
residents have low marginal propensities to save.3°/ Several important 
policy conclusions have followed from these assumptions: (1) little 
investment takes place on fanns in less developed countries, (2) most 
investment which does take place must be financed by credit provided 
from sources outside of agriculture, (3) mobilization of capital from 
the agricultural sector must be largely done on an involuntary basis, 
and (4) since little savings capacity exists, institutions and incen-
tives to save are not necessary in rural areas. 
With these kinds of assumptions, it is not surprising that inter-
national lending agencies have not encouraged countries to attempt to 
mobilize rural savings by offering favorable rates of interest as well 
as institutional forms. 
As can be noted in Table VI, time deposits in savings institutions 
in a number of Latin American countries are relatively insignificant.31/ 
This is especially true ~n countries where rapid rates of inflation 
have occurred. Monetary depreciation coupled with fixed low interest 
rates have provided little incentive for people to institutionalize 
savings.32/ In several countries a conscious policy of inflation has 
been followed as a substitute for voluntary savings. 
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It is particularly interesting to note the differences among coun-
tries in the ratios of savings to domestic-credit-claims-on-private-
sector. In the U. S., for example, institutional savings makes up al-
most 90 percent of the value of domestic-credit-claims-on-private-
sector. In Taiwan, the ratic is almost unity. It can be noted in 
Table VI, however, that countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Uruguay, and Peru have very small ratios of savings to credit. It is 
probably fair to assume that very little of their savings is coming 
from the rural area. 
Unfortunately, little information is available on how responsive 
rural people in Latin America might be to increases in the rates of 
interest paid on savings. Recent experience in Korea, however, suggests 
that the supply of savings may be rather elasttc with respect to interest 
rates. In the last part of 1965, the Monetary Board of the Republic 
of Korea approximately doubled the rate of interest which could be 
paid on time deposits. Since this interest rate reform, the amount of 
time and savings deposits has doubled each year.33/ Not only has there 
been a rapid increase in amount deposited for savings, but also a rapid 
increase in number of savings accounts. In September, 1965, before the 
interest rate reform, fewer than 150,000 savings accoupts existed in 
South Korea. By December, 1968, over one million savings accounts had 
been opened. Unfortunately, there is no information available on how 
much of this dramatic increase in savings came from the rural area. 
There is little reason to think, however, that rural people did not 
participate in this in a major way. 
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Table VI 
Domestic Credit Claims on Private Sector 
Time and Savings Deposits, with Indc~es, Rates of Change, and Ratios 
for Eight~en Latin Ame=ican Count~ics 
1960 to 196 . .:. 
Domestic Credit Claims Time & Savin~s DeEosits 
on Private Sector l.J. Year-End Balances Ll 
Country 
Year (A) (B) (C) (:C) 
Rate of Millions of Index Millions of Index 
Change Dollars/2 1960=100 Dollars/2 1960=100 
18 Country Totals 
1960 10,931 100 3,190 100 
1967 or 1968 15,106 138 6,398 201 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 5% 13% 
Argentina 
1960 2,380 100 82J 100 
1968 2,833 112 1,532 186 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 1% 11% 
Bolivia 
1960 8 100 1 100 
1968 J2 400 12 1,200 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 50% 125% 
Brazil 
1960 3,557 100 281 100 
1968 4 ,Jll 121 550 196 
Average Annual 
12i'o Rate of Change 3% 
Chile 
"'1%o 415 100 97 100 
1968 611 147 188 194 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 6% 12% 
Colombia 
1960 646 100 180 100 
1968 1,101 170 248 138 
Average Annual 5% Rate of Change 9% 
Costa Rica 100 1960 114 100 16 
1968 143 125 31 194 
Average Annual 12% Rate of Change 3% 
(E) 
c 
A 
.2S 
.42 
.35 
.54 
.13 
.38 
.08 
.13 
.23 
.31 
.28 
.23 
.14 
.22 
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Domestic Credit Claims Time & Savinss DeEosits 
on Private Sector f.1. Year-End Balances L! 
Count,:y 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (S) 
Rate of Millions of Inde:;: Millions of Inde.< c 
Change Dollarsil, 1960=100 Dollars/2 1960=100 A. 
Dominican ReEublic 
1960 103 100 31 100 .30 
1968 174 169 71 229 . .::::.1 
Avc:rage Annual 
Rate of Change 9% 16% 
Ecuador 
1960 158 100 21 100 .13 
1968 224 142 53 252 .24 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 5% 19'7o 
El Salvador 
1960 140 100 21 100 .15 
1967 191 136 93 443 .l~9 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 5% 49% 
Guatemala 
1960 94 100 36 100 .38 
1968 220 234 135 375 .61 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 17% 34% 
Honduras 
1960 35 100 19 100 .% 
1968 75 214 50 263 .67 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 14% 20% 
Mexico 
1960 . 1,145 100 833 100 .73 
1968 1,865 163 1,879 226 1.01 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 9% 16% 
Nicarasua 
1960 52 100 5 100 .10 
1968 142 273 30 600 .21 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 22% 63% 
Panama 
1960 99 100 29 101) .29 
1967 226 228 85 293 .38 
Average Annual 28% Rate of Change 18% 
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Domestic Cred;_ t Claims Tt~e & Savi~gs Deposits 
on Private Secto;rr- Year-End Balances7I 
Country 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Rate of Millions of Index Milliol:'S of Index c 
Change Dollars.L.?. 1960=100 Dollars fl. 1960=100 A 
f_0raguay 
1960 28 100 3 100 .11 
1968 83 296 30 1,000 .36 
Average Annua 1 
Rate of Change 25% 113% 
Peru 
---r9"60 343 100 168 100 .49 
1968 444 129 243 ( f 6 7) 145 .55 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 4% 6% 
Uruguay 
1960 420 100 131 100 .31 
1967 301 72 69 53 .18 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change -4% -6% 
Venezuela 
1960 1,197 100 495 100 .41 
1968 2' 172 128 1,099 222 .51 
Average Annual 
Rate of Change 10% 15% 
Ll Taken from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
various issues. 
~ Local currency values in each case were adjusted by the yearly consumer 
price index figures with base in 1963, published by the International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. The 
1963 exchange rate of local currency for dollars was then used to convert 
to an "adjusted dollar value." The figures in the table, therefore, show 
the 1963 purchasing power of local currency expressed in dollars. 
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In the early 1950's, Taiwan was also quite successful in mobilizir.g 
voluntary savings by raising interest rates. 34/ Less well-documented 
cases of recent substantial increases in institutional savings resulting 
from interest incentives have also occurred in Indonesia and Turkey. 
It may well be that if rural people in Latin America had adequate 
economic incentive and an institutional form in which to save, substan-
tial amounts of local capital could be mobilized to significantly comple-
ment external funds for credit. Currently, rural people must hold 
savings in land investments or in livestock. The growth in credit 
unions during the past five years in Latin f®erica shows that some 
additional capital can be mobili~ed if institutional forms are simply 
available. Between 1963 and 1968, funds in credit unions in Latin 
America increased frorn less than eight million dollars worth to about 
57 million dollars. 35/ Approximately 30 to 40 percent of this has been 
raised in rural areas. 
Present policy in Latin America results in large subsidies to 
credit users and yet almost completely discourages institutional savings. 
Does a significant amount of potential savings exist in rural areas of 
Latin America? Evidence frorr1 studies in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
suggest that rural savings capacity does exist. 36 / Could mobilization 
of these savings, especially in areas where rapid technological change 
is occurring -- southern Brazil and the Cauca Valley of Colombia, for 
example -- provide a substantial portion of the agricultural credit 
needs? The possibilities look favorable enough to warrent focusing 
some policy attention on this area. 
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VI. Conclusions and RecommendatioL 
In the preceding, I have attempted to make the following points: 
(1) Large amounts of external funds have been channeled into agricul-
tural credit in Latin America during the last decade and this, plus 
major in~uts of local resources have resulted in a substantial increase 
in the availability of agricultural credit in most Latin .~erican count-
ries. (2) Despite the magnitude of the rescurces transferred into agri-
cultural credit systems, little attePtion has been directed to the 
economic rationale used to construct current policy in this regard. 
Little emphasis has been placed on efficiency prices for credit. Erosion 
of the real value of credit funds and inefficient resource allocation 
have resulted. (3) The amount of informal credit in rural areas of 
Latin America is apparently rather insignificant in comparison with 
that available from institutional sources. It is not entirely clear as 
to why this is so, but there is some indication that heavily subsidized 
institutional credit may have resulted in non-institutional credit 
atrophy. (4) For Latin ,\merica as a whole, agricultural credit needs 
at efficiency prices have probably been exaggerated. Nevertheless, in 
cases where rapid technological change is possible, credit shortage can 
be a major block. Substantial amounts of credit are needed at points 
where technological change is rapidly occurring. (5) Little emphasis 
has been placed on mobilizing rural savi~gs for credit use. 
Policy Recommendations 
During the 1960's, aid agencies helped to sharply expand the amount 
of institutional agricultural credit in Latin America. It is rather 
clear, however, that some changes in current policy could make these 
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credit programs more efficient. In develcping credit ~olicy, for example, 
too little attention has been paid to the heterogeneity of agriculture. 
Careful attention must be directed to aL examination of the effective 
demand for agricultural credit among various types of farms in Latin 
America. When interest rates do not reflect efficiency prices, market 
demand for credit is a poor indication of the economically efficient 
demand. Hard data is needed on where credit shortage is a major bottle-
neck and on where technological change will require large doses of 
credit. Other policies must be designed to address rural problems net 
related to production credit shortage. 
In line with this, aid agencies need to encourage Latin American 
governments to move toward efficiency prices for agricultural credit, 
and to guard against credit capital erosion. This will generally involve 
increasing the rates of interest on agricultural loans rather substan-
tially. The rate of interest should reflect the opportunity cost of 
capital to society andcover credit administration costs, plus include 
a factor for monetary depreciation and possible defaults. In cases 
where inflationary pressures are strong, adjustments in the interest 
rate may be impractical, and some sort of monetary correction on princi-
pal may be necessary. Where income transfers to agriculture are desirable, 
a number of instruments other than subsidized credit appear to be more 
efficient. 
A general increase in rates of interest charged on agricultural 
credit would necessitate, in many cases, a restructuring of farm pricing 
and monetary policy. Aid agencies would need to face the Latin hmerican 
countries with a united front in order to encourage such changes. 
-34-
~ttention should also be directed toward activities which epcourage 
the growth of informal credtt. In most cases, irdividuals who provide 
this credit have been cast as goblins and gnomes. A significant infor-
mal credit market can facilitate the development process. Accelerated 
rural development wlll likely lead to an e~pansion in informal credit, 
but it is unlikely that this expansion can be very rapid as long as 
institutional credit is rather plentiful as well as heavily subsidized. 
Lastly, it i& time that aid agencies and Latin ~merican governments 
begin to encourage voluntary mobilization of rural savings. Voluntary 
savings capacity ic rural areas may be significant. Moreover, there is 
no reason to think that marginal propensities to save among rural resi-
dents are significantly different from the rest of the society. Where 
rapid technological change is occurring, there is reason to think that 
part of the resulting increase in income would be saved in institutions 
if proper institutions were available in rural areas, if incentive rates 
of interest were paid on savings, and if appropriate insurance was pro-
vided against institutional failure. Mobilized rural savings in the 
future should provide a major portion of the increase in funds for agri-
cultural credit in Latin America. 
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